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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ININs-CR uwAL PROCEDum: HABEAS CORPUS AS AN ENFORCE-
MENT PROCEDURE UNDER THE INDIAN CVm EIGHTS AcT OF 1968,
25 U.S.C. §§ 1302-1303.
The Indian Civil Rights Act, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
extended portions of the Bill of Rights to individual Indians as against
their tribal governments and provided federal habeas corpus relief to
review alleged violations of these rights.1 The Indian Bill of Rights
marked the culmination of a complete reversal in federal recognition of
Indian constitutional rights. Until 1965 federal courts had recognized
Indian tribes as quasi-sovereign entities.2 Individual Indians were guar-
anteed their constitutional rights in relations with federal and state
governments, but not with their tribal governments.8 The only rights
1. The text of the Indian Bill of Rights, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302-03 (Supp. V, 1970) reads:
§ 1302. Constitutional Rights
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall-
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and to petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or thing to be seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and public
trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual punish-
ments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or
punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of six months or a fine of $500, or
both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or
deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the
right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
§ 1303. Habeas Corpus
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in a
court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian
tribe.
2. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896), first enunciated the doctrine of the limited
sovereignty of Indian tribes.
3. Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959),
for example, held that the first amendment prohibition against governmental interference
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Indian governments recognized when dealing with Indians were those
guaranteed by tribal custom and tradition. In 1965 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in Colliflower v. Garland,4 held that federal courts
may issue a writ of habeas corpus to determine the legality of detention
of an Indian jailed by a tribal court without benefit of constitutional
due process. Colliflower was reaffirmed and expanded in 1969 by Settler
v. Yakima Tribal Court.5
The wisdom of Congress in adopting habeas corpus as a means of
review must be examined. Habeas was the only means available to the
courts, but not the only means available to Congress. This note will
examine: (1) the inconsistency of Congress's adoption of habeas corpus
relief; (2) the Indian tribal justice system; (3) the impact of tradi-
tional habeas corpus review on that system; (4) alternatives to habeas
corpus review.
I. CONGRESSIONAL INCONSISTENCY
Congress enacted the Indian Bill of Rights "to protect individual
Indians from arbitrary and unjust actions of tribal governments." 6
Section 1302 guarantees the individual Indian basically the same con-
stitutional rights enjoyed by all Americans.' To enforce those rights,
Congress enacted Section 1303, providing the writ of habeas corpus to
test, in federal court, "the legality of his [any person's] detention by
order of an Indian tribe."' This means of enforcing the provisions of
section 1302 is arguably the most important part of the Indian Bill of
Rights. Without adequate enforcement, the rights conferred by the Act
are illusory. However, by the same token, the damage to the Indian
tribe resulting from an excessive power of enforcement by habeas corpus
with religious freedom did not apply to Indian tribal governments in the absence of an
act of Congress.
4. 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
5. 419 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970). Settler was decided
prior to the effective date of the Indian Civil Rights Act.
Settler expanded the rule of Colliflower in two ways: (1) habeas corpus relief was
extended to a petitioner free on bail, not jailed as was the petitioner in Colliflower; (2)
in Colliflower, federal relief was granted because the tribal court was a Court of Indian
Offenses, partially federally funded and controlled. In Settler relief was granted even
though the court was funded and run by the tribe itself.
6. S. REP. No. 841, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1968).
7. See note 1, supra.
8. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (Supp. V, 1970).
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may outweigh the benefits conferred on the individual Indian. The
enforcement procedure must be tailored to the society in which it is to
operate.
In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior stated:'
[T]he Constitution of the United States was adopted by a people
whose philosophical and political roots were deeply imbedded in
the history of England and of Western Europe. Many of the re-
straints and limitations on the United States contained in the U.S.
Constitution were an outgrowth of that history. On the other hand,
the people of the Indian tribes have their roots in an entirely differ-
ent culture and it may be that the devices which appropriately
protected the interests of the Anglo-American of the late 18th
century may not be appropriate to protect the Indian tribal mem-
ber of the middle-20th century.
With this cultural disparity in mind, Congress took great pains to ac-
commodate the ten provisions of the Indian Bill of Rights to Indian
life and custom. Two examples are Sections 1302(1) and 1302(6).
Section 1302(1) recites the provisions of the first amendment, but
omits the prohibition against establishment of religion in recognition
of the theocratic nature of tribal governments. Section 1302(6) is
similar to the sixth amendment, but adds the provision that the cost of
counsel at trial is to be borne by the client. Section 1302(6) recognized
(1) the traditional nature of tribal court proceedings, often making an
attorney unnecessary,"° and (2) the burden which tribes without
means or a local associated bar would have to bear should they be
required to appoint counsel upon demand."
In light of the Solicitor's statement and Congress' precautionary
efforts in Section 1302, it is at best inconsistent that no such accomoda-
tions were made in enacting the enforcement section of the Indian Bill
of Rights. Habeas corpus is a traditional remedy of the Anglo-American
judicial system, truly an "18th century device." As demonstrated later
in this note, its use reflects a disregard for the uniqueness of the Indian
9. Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the American Indian Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 17
(1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Senate Hearings].
10. Lazarus, Title I1 of the 1968 Civil Rights Act: An Indian Bill of Rights, 45 No.
DAx. L. REv. 337, 339 (1969).
11. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 341.
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judicial system and a failure to consider the cultural values faithfully
recognized in Section 1302. A possible explanation is that habeas
corpus was adopted when defects in the original enforcement proposal
were discovered. The original proposal, Senate Bill 962, would have
allowed appeal to the federal court for a trial de novo where a constitu-
tional violation in the tribal trial was alleged. 2 The trial de novo con-
cept was rejected, however, apparently for fear that a small number of
district courts would be overcome by a great flood of de novo appeals. 3
The Department of the Interior's recommended substitute, habeas
corpus, 4 was adopted, though apparently no testimony concerning the
choice of habeas corpus was given. The choice of habeas relief was not
carefully considered, as were the Section 1302 provisions, and certainly
was not tailored to the situation in Indian courts.
II. THE INDIAN TRIBAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
There are eighty-four Indian courts, divided into three categories:
nineteen traditional courts; fifty-three tribal courts; and twelve Courts
of Indian Offenses. 5 The jurisdiction of those eighty-four courts is
similar to that of a justice court. 6 Congress has, through the so-called
Major Crimes Act, removed jurisdiction over thirteen major crimes
from the Indian courts.' 7 The Indian Bill of Rights, Section 1302(7)
12. SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COsM. ON T3E JUDICIARY,
SUMMARY REPORT OF HEARINGS AND INVESTIGATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
THE AMERICAN INDIAN, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (Comm. Print 1966) [hereinafter cited as
1966 Senate Print].
13. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 22.
14. Id. at 318.
15. SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE CoMMS. ON THE JUDICIARY,
SUMMARY REPORT OF HEARINGS AND INVESTIGATIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF TIE
AMERICAN INDIAN, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (Comm. Print 1964) [hereinafter cited as 1964
Senate Print].
16. Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Govern-
ments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1343, 1356 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 82 HARv. L. REV.].
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (Supp. V, 1970) states in part:
Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other
person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, rape, carnal
knowledge of any female, not his wife, who has not attained the age of sixteen years,
assault with intent to commit rape, incest, assault with intent to kill, assault with a
dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, burglary, robbery,
and larceny within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same laws and penalties
as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive juris-
diction of the United States.
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forbids imposition of a sentence of imprisonment greater than six
months by the seventy-two traditional and tribal courts.'
The traditional courts operate without written codes for either law or
procedure.' 9 Trial is by the same group which governs the tribe, with
the governor of the tribe presiding. ° There is no provision for juries and
infrequent provision for counsel.21 The Pueblos, who operate traditional
courts, believe that their judicial system already guaranteed the rights
enumerated in the Indian Bill of Rights. 22
Tribal courts enforce written criminal codes covering some forty
offenses;as promulgated by the tribe itself, the codes must be approved
by the Secretary of the Interior.2 4 The judges in such courts are nor-
mally laymen; in 1968, of the sixty-five formal (tribal and Indian
Offenses) courts, only five had judges who were licensed attorneys.2 5
This lack of legal training is not a substantial handicap, however, since
most of the tribal cases deal with traditional and customary law, where
legal expertise is not required.20 Court sessions are informal and rarely
are records of the proceedings kept.2 Trial by jury, where available, is
most often waived 28
The Courts of Indian Offenses were created by federal regulation to
replace those tribal court systems which have failed.29 Courts of Indian
Offenses administer a criminal code promulgated by the federal govern-
ment: the courts have jurisdiction over approximately fifty criminal
offenses; the maximum length of imprisonment the courts may impose is
nine months.0 Judges are appointed and paid by the federal govern-
18. See note 1, supra.
19. Benge, Law and Order on Indian Reservations, 20 FEn. BJ. 223, 225-26 (1960).
20. Hearing on Rights of Members of Indian Tribes Before the Subcomm. on Indian
Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as 1968 House Hearing].
21. 82 HAav. L. REv., supra note 16, at 1357.
22. 1968 House Hearing, supra note 20, at 50.
23. 1964 Senate Print, supra note 15, at 15.
24. Kerr, Constitutional Rights, Tribal Justice, and the American Indian, 18 J. PuB.
L. 311, 320 (1969).
25. 1968 House Hearing supra note 20, at 29.
26. Id. at 27.
27. Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the American Indian Before the Subcomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Seas.,
pt. 1, at 103, 135 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 Senate Hearings].
28. Of 44,557 civil and criminal cases in all three courts in 1961, there were 58 jury
trials. 1961 Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 250.
29. 25 C.F.R. § 11.1(b) (1970), promulgated under the authority of 25 U.S.C. § 2
(1964).
30. Id. §§ 11.38-11.87 NH.
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ment; the number of judges per court and procedures for administering
criminal and civil justice are set forth in 25 C.F.R. Part 11 (1970).
The Indian judicial system is lacking in adequate appeal procedure.
While the Courts of Indian Offenses have an appeal procedure pro-
vided,"1 appeals from the seventy-two traditional and tribal courts are
haphazard at best. Appeals from the tribal courts are heard by a three
man appellate tribunal, consisting of the trial judge and two members
of the tribe. 2 In the traditional court, appeals are heard by the tribal
council.13 The appellate structure of the tribal system is rarely used,
however: there were only thirty-three appeals in 44,557 cases from all
three courts in 1961. 84
Despite the shortcomings of the Indian judicial systems from the
white man's viewpoint, the systems engender a great amount of respect
among the Indians. The Indian philosophy of law is concerned with
restitution and rehabilitation, rather than retribution and incarceration.
There is less concern with the intricacies of bail procedure and booking,
and more concern with "making the injured party whole."35 The result
is more releases on personal recognizance with judge-made schemes of
restitution, especially among the traditional courts. The Indian judge
has specialized knowledge of both Indian law and custom which a
federal judge cannot match. The Indian procedure assures the individ-
ual Indian freedom from the discrimination he faces or believes he may
face in the white court."6
Moreover, the Indian system does provide constitutional safeguards
on an informal basis. An expert on Indian law testified that after speak-
31. Id. § 11.6.
32. 1964 Senate Print, supra note 15, at 16.
33. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 263.
34. 1961 Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 250-52.
35. Note, The Indian: The Forgotten American, 81 HAav. L. Rav. 1818, 1836 n.155
(1968) [hereinafter cited as 81 HARV. L. REv.]; 1968 House Hearing, supra note 20, at 52.
An example of the restitutive philosophy is the testimony of the Chairman of the All
Indian Pueblo Council of New Mexico (1968 House Hearing at 37-38):
We hope to incorporate [in our model code] the principles that our courts have
traditionally employed-that is, seeking to make the injured party, or the one against
whom the offense is committed, whole. For example, if one of our members should
injure another to the extent that the injured party for a period of time could not work
his fields or provide for his family, our system traditionally required the aggressor to
substitute his services in providing for the injured and his family. Since such an of-
fense is against the tribe as well, we sometimes exact an additional penalty for the
tribe in the form of community work. Is not this better than merely exacting a fine or
imposing a jail sentence?
36. 81 HARV. L. REV., supra note 35, at 1836.
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iug at a conference of Indian judges and remarking that the constitu-
tional protections did not extend to Indians on reservations, the
response of the judges was surprise: 7
The first point that came out from the audience was surprise
that the Constitution did not apply on the reservation, because
these judges had been applying it.... [T]hey... did not feel their
major problem stemmed from any deprivation of constitutional
rights.... [T]hey did not have on the reservation instances of
illegal searches and seizures or police brutality or detention before
arraignment ....
This point goes in part to the wisdom of extending Section 1302 pro-
tection to the Indians, which is not examined here. The testimony does
underline the very different situation which prevails on Indian reserva-
tions, and the need for tailoring enforcement remedies to the nature of
the problem. Constitutional guarantees exist on the reservations, but
in forms which the federal courts may not recognize.
III. THE IMPACT OF TRADITIONAL HABEAS CORPUS ON
THE INDIAN TRIBAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
The threat habeas corpus review poses to the Indian courts is the
removal of effective adjudication from the tribal courts. The tribal
court, though its jurisdiction is limited, still remains a viable and visible
exercise of tribal government. To hamper such an exercise is contrary
to the recently expressed and growing desire of Indians to run their
own lives.38
The federal court in a habeas proceeding ordinarily is limited to
application of the correct constitutional standard to the facts under-
lying the constitutional claim. 9 The record from the lower court must
be adequate to weigh the sufficiency of the allegations and evidence and
must be free of "unusual circumstances," or a repetition of the trial will
be necessary Since the traditional and tribal courts generally have no
37. 1961 Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 213.
38. 1968 House Hearing, supra note 20, at 57. The difficulty of collecting representative
data indicative of all Indian's feelings should be noted, however. See 81 Hfnv. L. REv.,
supra note 35, at 1818.
39. Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HEMv. L. REv. 1038, 1113
(1970) [hereinafter cited as 83 HEv. L. Rv.].
40. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463 (1953).
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record to supply the federal court for its review of the trial the federal
court would obviously have to conduct a complete evidentiary hearing.
The tribal court proceeding would thus be of no effect whatsoever.
Even in the unlikely event that records of the proceedings of the
tribal courts are kept, a complete evidentiary review would still be
required, so much does the tribal system differ from the Anglo-Ameri-
can. Townsend v. Sai 4' established five circumstances in which the
federal court, in habeas review, must hold an evidentiary hearing: in-
adequate factfinding procedure; inadequate development of facts;
determination not fairly supported by the facts; failure to resolve the
relevant factual issues; and the prisoner's allegation of newly discovered
evidence.42 The first four circumstances may readily apply to review of
tribal and traditional court decisions. Tribal court decisions are not
reasoned and decided as are state and federal decisions. The body of
traditional law underlying such decisions is not cognizable in federal
courts. The tribal court is not analogous in either procedure or legal
principles to the state and lower federal courts to which Townsend
was to apply.
Were the traditional standards of habeas corpus applied strictly to
the tribal court, fact relitigation would thus be necessary in the great
majority of habeas proceedings. Tribal court decisions in such cases
would be of no effect, because the net result of the habeas hearing will
be essentially a new trial to decide what the tribal court has passed
upon. In theory the relitigation would be confined to constitutional
issues, but the effect will be to subordinate the tribal courts to the
federal courts. One of the complaints voiced against the rejected trial
41. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
42. See 83 HARv. L. Rxv., supra note 39, at 1122. The court added a sixth discretionary
category for situations in which the state fails to provide a full and fair evidentiary hear-
ing. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Supp. V, 1970), essentially embodying Townsend, states eight
circumstances requiring evidentiary hearing in the federal court:
(1) inadequate factual resolution;
(2) inadequate factfinding procedure;
(3) inadequate development of material facts;
(4) the State court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or the person of
the applicant;
(5) failure of the State court to appoint counsel for an indigent;
(6) applicant's hearing was not full, fair or adequate;
(7) denial of process of law;
(8) failure of the record as a whole to support the State court's factual determina-
tion.
548
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de novo was the subordinating effect such review would have on tribal
courts43 The same criticism validly applies to habeas corpus review:"
To force a revolutionary change upon the tribal court systems,
and the tribal governments, would cause a complete failure of the
existing system. Certainly the committee must be aware that no
tribal court could retain the respect of the Indian peoples it serves
if its decisions were consistently criticized and overturned by the
Federal courts.
Certain testimony indicated that the impact of habeas corpus should
be mitigated to preserve the Indian court system.45 One suggested
mitigating change was the use of the doctrine of "fundamental fairness"
in determining the due process standard of tribal justice.46 There are
two problems with the application of such a doctrine. First, "funda-
mental fairness," stated generally, considers the "totality of the circum-
stances" in determining whether the questioned procedure "shocks the
conscience of the court."47 The standard of judgment is that of the
"conscience" of a federal judge. Such a standard is arguably unsuited
to a determination of the conscionability of tribal justice proceedings.
The tribal justice system is foreign, both procedurally and substan-
tively, to the federal judge, and his judgment, however well reasoned,
may not comprehend the traditional and customary underpinning of a
particular case in a particular Indian court.
The second and more obvious problem is that such a modification
would not change the necessity for evidentiary hearings in the federal
court. The subordinating effect of habeas review, referred to earlier,
43. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 66.
44. Id. 341 (statement of the Mescalero Apache Tribe). With that statement compare
the statement of the Pueblos (1968 House Hearing, supra note 20, at 37):
Section [1303J, habeas corpus, opens an avenue through which Federal courts,
lacking knowledge of our traditional values, customs, and laws, could review and offset
the decisions of our councils sitting as courts and acting on the basis of our own laws
and customs as tribal courts.
45. 1961 Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 29 (statement of Assistant Secretary of the
Interior John A. Carver):
[I]nsistence upon strict application in the Indian courts as they are now consti-
tuted... of the same procedural safeguards that apply in the non-Indian judicial
system would result in the destruction of the Indian court system and would leave the
Indian people, in a great many instances, without any protection.
Carver's views were not accepted by all, however. See 1964 Senate Print, supra note 1,
at 16.
46. 82 HARV. L. Rlv., supra note 16, at 1353.
47. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
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would not be substantially lessened. The "fundamental fairness" modi-
fication goes only to the standard to be applied by the federal court
once evidentiary findings are made.
In addition to the incalculable dimunition to Indian self-government,
the subordination of the tribal justice system will impose very real costs
on the tribes. The petitioner must pay for the services of his attorney;
the tribe as well will have to be represented in federal court. More im-
portant to the tribes is the cost and inconvenience of traveling to the
district court for the trial, costs which many tribes and their members
cannot bear.48 It may be that the total costs of habeas corpus review
may be greater than the benefit of the rights habeas is to protect.
IV. THE ALTERNATIVES TO HABEAS REVIEW
Habeas corpus is an improper tool to enforce the provisions of the
Indian Bill of Rights. While the provisions of Section 1302 were well-
tailored to meet the unique Indian situation, the enforcement tool
was not. There is a definite need for some system of appeal, but lifting
cases from the tribal courts and relitigating them in the federal courts
is inappropriate and unnecessary.
There are two possible alternatives to habeas review. One, federal
appeal, is a compromise which accomodates both federal review and a
viable tribal court system. The other alternative is review by the
Indians themselves.
A. Federal Appeal
The compromise solution provides review by means of appeal to
federal district courts. The court would not be bound by the Townsend
criteria for evidentiary hearings, but could hold hearings only to the
extent the record was inadequate. Should there be no violation of con-
stitutional rights, the tribal court's judgment would stand. Should a
violation be discovered, the court could vacate and remand either for
(1) dismissal of the complaint or (2) a new trial in Indian court free
of the defects.4 9 The latter provision should be followed wherever
possible. Constitutional rights will be guaranteed the individual Indian
48. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 341-42.
49. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 341.
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while tribal courts are educated in the rights to be accorded criminal
defendants.
Modifications of both tribal procedure and federal substantive law
are necessary to this scheme. First, there must be an adequate record
at the trial level; a tape recording may suffice.5" Second, the federal
court in determining the sufficiency of tribal judicial procedure from
the record should apply the harmless error rule broadly. Rule 52(a)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states: "Any error, defect,
irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be
disregarded." 51 Harmless error applies, however, only when the error
committed is not so great as to taint the entire trial. Where the confes-
sion has been coerced, the right to counsel denied, or a judge has been
biased, such errors infect the entire trial, and the decision must be
automatically reversed.5 2 To best preserve the dignity of the Indian
courts the application of automatic reversal should be limited in Indian
court appeals. Automatic reversal of a decision will educate the Indian
court in nothing more than the invalidity of its decision. The oppor-
tunity to infuse constitutional law with customary law will be lost,
which is the purpose of the review and remand system.
It is clear that automatic reversal does not follow all constitutional
errors."' Disagreement arises, however, in deciding when automatic
reversal must be granted. Mr. Justice Stewart expressed one view in
Chapman v. California: 5
[C]onstitutional rights are not fungible goods. The differing
values which they represent and protect may make a harmless-
error rule appropriate for one type of constitutional error and not
for another.
The reviewing district court, in sum, should apply the automatic rever-
sal rule only to those errors which the Supreme Court has deemed so
great as to require automatic reversal. Even then the differing values
of the Indian system should be considered. In determining the bias of
50. Fretz, The Bill of Rights and American Indian Tribal Governments, 6 NAT. Ras. J.
581, 601 n.76 (1966).
51. FED. R. Cam. P. 52(a).
52. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1967). Mr. Justice Stewart in his
concurring opinion summarized other cases requiring automatic reversal. 386 U.S. at 42-44.
53. Id. at 23.
54. Id. at 44.
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an Indian judge, for example, the court must consider the relative
closeness of the Indian judge or judicial council to the people, as com-
pared to the white judge. The Indian judge may well know the parties
involved, the relevant evidence, and community sentiment. The prin-
ciples of law he will apply may be as much traditional as statutory,
therefore the degree of subjectivity in his decision may be great. The
bias present in such a proceeding is obvious, but its extent is unascer-
tainable. In such cases the reviewing court should not automatically
reverse but should determine the harmfulness of the error in the over-
all proceeding.
Where harmless error is applicable, the test for determining the
harmfulness of the error is uncertain. In Chapman, the Supreme Court
stated one test for harmfulness: unless the error was "harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt, 115 it was harmful and grounds for reversal. In
Harrington v. California,"6 however, the Supreme Court's test was
whether the error when separated from the trial was so insignificant as
to be inconsequential. Thus in Harrington the overwhelming evidence
against the accused was so great as to render harmless the failure of the
court to allow the accused to cross-examine hostile witnesses.
Determination of an error's harmfulness in the tribal court setting
should be in accord with the "overwhelming" standard adopted in
Harrington. The "overwhelming" standard avoids the subjectivity of
the Chapman test, which necessarily must consider the effect of the
tainted evidence on the average jury. The Harrington test compares
the tainted evidence with the untainted in determining its harmfulness.
While the Supreme Court has left unclear which is the test, the over-
whelming evidence test is more appropriate to review of the Indian
system. Rather than burdening the white court with the difficult task
of dividing the impact of certain evidence on the Indian judge, council,
or jury, the federal court's test should be the more objective balancing
of evidence.
While problems of travel to the higher court and financing of appeals
remain, the review and remand system mitigates the effect of federal
review on the Indian court system itself. The need for a full eviden-
55. Id. at 24.
56. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
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tiary hearing is reduced by (1) establishment of a record; and (2)
freeing the federal courts from the statutory criteria for evidentiary
hearings in habeas review cases. The remand requirement should enable
Indian courts to correct deficiencies while retaining primary control
over Indian defendants. Yet, one principal problem remains: federal
courts, in determining whether to affirm, remand, or vacate Indian
court decisions, will be judging the Indian system by non-Indian stan-
dards.
B. Indian Appeals
The second alternative, establishment of an Indian court of appeals,
would insure Indian control of the judicial process as it affects Indians.
The circuit courts would be composed of members from each tribe
within designated jurisdictions. The courts could hear appeals which
under the current system would be heard by the federal courts on
habeas corpus review. By requiring written records of the decisions of
the circuit court, a substantial and much-needed body of Indian law
could be developed.5 7 The circuit courts proposal assumes that the
judges of the courts will be afforded opportunities for study of and
training in the application of constitutional rights to Indian defendants.
As suggested by one tribe, a study of the nature and application of
constitutional rights would require tribal judges to study at least one
month every year for at least three years, in an academic setting. The
formal study would be supplemented by continuing home study of
constitutional problems.58 A program to adequately train circuit judges
could be carried out at a regional law school under the auspices of the
federal government. Arizona State University and the Universities of
New Mexico and South Dakota now provide Indians with some legal
training. 9 The implementation of this program would insure the
application of constitutional rights to Indian defendants while preserv-
ing Indian self-government and the Indian judicial system.60
57. 81 HARv. L. REa., supra note 35, at 1836.
58. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 342.
59. 81 HAnv. L. REv., supra note 35, at 1833.
60. It is arguable, however, that an Indian judge from one tribe would be no more
familiar with the law of another tribe than would a federal judge. This criticism is mis-
placed to the extent that there are common threads running through Indian law, such as
the emphasis on restitution and rehabilitation. See Part 11, supra.
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CONCLUSION
The perceived efficacy of the use of the writ of habeas corpus ulti-
mately depends on the observer's prejudice toward the Indian and
Indian self-government. The view here is premised on the continued
existence of a viable Indian court, as a part of Indian self-government.
Indians recently have expressed a growing desire to run their own
lives and not be assimilated into the mainstream of American life.0 '
So long as the Indian seeks to remain a separate subculture, "it seems
both appropriate and essential that Indian governments control those
internal affairs . .. deeply interwoven with tribal culture and tradi-
tion."0 2 Tribal courts, as a part of that culture and tradition, should not
be subject to complete federal intervention in the form of a habeas
corpus review. That intervention, while necessary to some extent,
should have as little impact as possible on tribal life.
61. But see note 38, supra.
62. Comment, The "Right of Tribal Self-Government" and Jurisdiction of Indian
Affairs, 1970 UTAu L. REv. 291, 294 (1970).
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